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ABSTRACT
Electronic communication impacts how widely-held
corporations conduct shareholder meetings. For example,
technology has facilitated such options as electronic proxy voting,
remote electronic voting, and “virtual meetings.” This iBrief
examines the idea of “virtual meetings” and argues that they
should not entirely replace physical meetings unless an electronic
solution can be devised which replicates the face-to-face
accountability of management to retail shareholders.

INTRODUCTION
¶1
This iBrief examines the impact of electronic communication on the
way in which corporations conduct shareholder meetings. Specifically, it
focuses on widely-held public corporations because it is with respect to
these entities that e-commerce techniques could have the greatest impact on
shareholder participation.

AREAS OF IMPACT
¶2
Electronic communication has impacted shareholder meetings in
three realms, namely:

1

•

Electronic proxy voting: the electronic authentication
and submission of proxy appointments to the
corporation;

•

Remote (direct) electronic voting: shareholders voting
in their own name, although not physically attending
the meeting; and

•

Virtual meetings: “meetings” that do not involve a
physical gathering, but which take place in an
electronic form, such as via a remote ballot or a
corporation-sponsored electronic bulletin board.
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2004

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 8

A. Electronic Proxy Voting
¶3
Electronic proxy voting is the least controversial of these three
issues. As noted above, the electronic component of electronic proxy
voting relates both to the authentication of the appointment (which
generally involves entering a PIN into a telephone keypad or web-based
form, rather than a handwritten signature) and to the submission of that
appointment to the corporation (via telephone or the Internet). Electronic
proxy voting raises generic e-commerce issues—the meanings of
“signature” and “delivery”—rather than corporate law issues. This method
raises little controversy, provided it is offered as an option to shareholders,
and does not raise the prospect of depriving shareholders of the opportunity
to participate because of differential access to technology. However, a
corporation may be concerned that electronically-submitted votes are
invalid, thereby opening corporate resolutions to challenge.
¶4
Commentators, such as Verdun Edgtton, have argued that the law
would have been able to cope with this new “challenge” without statutory
changes because corporations are able to make their own provisions for the
authentication and submission of proxy appointments in their articles of
incorporation, or equivalent constitutional documents.2 In the same way
that courts have adjusted to accommodate the telegraph, the fax machine,
the telephone conference, and the video conference, courts would also, over
time, be able to assimilate electronic signature and electronic delivery as
those concepts become readily accepted in the community.3 However,
perhaps partly because of wider concerns about the effectiveness of
electronic modes of “signature,” and partly because of the business
community’s desire for certainty, many countries have resorted to
legislation to clarify the validity of electronic proxy votes.4

2

Verdun Edgtton, Appointment of Proxies by Electronic Communication: Do
Companies Have to Wait for Enabling Legislation?, 21 COMPANY LAWYER 294,
298 (2000).
3
Id.
4
See, e.g., Elizabeth Boros, Corporate Governance in Cyberspace: Who Stands
to Gain What from the Virtual Meeting?, 3 JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW
STUDIES 149, 150-55 (2003) (detailing UK, Australian and US reforms); Eddy
Wymeersch, The Use of ICT in Company Law Matters, FINANCIAL LAW
INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES 2000-11, at 20-21 (Nov. 2000) (detailing
European developments); JESPER LAU HANSEN, FOCUS: THE LISTED COMPANIES
AND THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION 1 (Copenhagen Stock Exchange, Focus
No. 62, Sept. 9, 2003), available at
http://www.cse.dk/kf/kf_pressemeddelelser?languageID=1&c=Page&cid=10346
98850162&contentid=1062141824343 (last visited July 14, 2004) (detailing
Danish developments).
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B. Remote Electronic Voting
¶5
Remote electronic voting is more difficult to categorize than
electronic proxy voting because it can take a number of different forms.
Many corporations now webcast their annual meetings in real time, and
some offer remotely-located shareholders the opportunity to “participate” in
the meeting by submitting questions via email.5 Where this is combined
with proxy voting it poses little challenge to the traditional concept of a
meeting. The issue becomes more complicated where shareholders who are
not “present”—in person or by proxy—are able to vote. At this point,
remote electronic voting merges with virtual meetings.

C. Virtual Meetings
¶6
There are multiple issues that arise with “virtual meetings,” namely
what is meant by the term “virtual meeting,” what a “meeting” really is, and
why corporations hold them.

1. Why Hold Meetings?
¶7
The general meeting of shareholders, as it is currently practiced in
widely-held public corporations, leaves a lot to be desired. These meetings
(at least in Australia and the UK) are poorly attended by institutional
shareholders, most of whom regard visits by analysts and direct contact with
management as more effective ways to influence the governance and
business direction of corporations in their portfolios.6 The concerns of
institutional shareholders are usually dealt with before the general meeting,
and to the extent that issues do arise for a vote at the meeting, the outcome
will generally have been determined by proxy votes lodged by institutional
shareholders well in advance of the meeting.7 The other main category of
shareholders, retail shareholders, is rationally apathetic and very few attend

5

SECURITIES IN THE ELECTRONIC AGE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE LAW AND
REGULATION 7-9 (John F. Olson & Harvey L. Pitt eds., Glasser LegalWorks,
1997).
6
See Shareholder Activism Among Fund Managers: Policy and Practice (Inv.
& Fin. Servs. Ass’n Ltd.), July 2003, at 10-12 (regarding Australian
shareholders), available at
http://www.ifsa.com.au/IFSAWeb/Attach.nsf/Attachments/Board+Committee++Investment~Corporate+Governance~2001_0314_IFSA+Industry+overview%2
Epdf/$File/2001_0314_IFSA+Industry+overview.pdf (last visited July 14,
2004); Paul Myners, Institutional Investment in the UK: A Review, March 2001,
at ¶ 5.84 (regarding UK shareholders), at http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/media//843F0/31.pdf (last visited July 14, 2004).
7
See Graeme James, When companies incur the wrath of angry shareholders,
COURIER MAIL, Oct. 20, 2001, at 70.
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meetings or vote.8 Most could not attend even if they wished because
meetings are held during business hours and often far from the
shareholders’ homes. Therefore, the few individuals who do attend are
likely to be unrepresentative of the general body of shareholders.
Furthermore, the financial cost to the corporation of convening a meeting
with a substantial number of shareholders can be very high.9
¶8
However, it is not hard to find defenders of the general meeting.
Corporate law in most jurisdictions still requires public corporations to hold
an annual meeting.10 Delaware is an exception,11 but even there New York
Stock Exchange listing rules require listed corporations to hold annual
meetings.12 Moreover, even in Delaware, shareholders are able to act
without a meeting only with the written consent of the same percentage of
shareholders as of votes that would have been required to approve the action
at an actual meeting.13 At first sight this written consent option seems quite
“anti-meeting,” but considering how few shareholders attend or vote (either
in person or by proxy) at a normal meeting, obtaining an absolute majority

8

See, e.g., Gabrielle Costa, Investor Activism on the Rise, THE AGE, Dec. 16,
2003, at Business 3 (citing findings of a retail shareholder survey,
“[T]raditionally, ‘the number of shareholders voting at company meetings has
barely exceeded 10 percent.’”), available at
http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/12/15/1071336887971.html?from=story
rhs&oneclick =true (last visited July 14, 2004). This history of rational apathy
has led to efforts by regulators and shareholder associations to encourage greater
participation. See, e.g., Shareholders – have your say (Australian Securities and
Investments Commission and Australian Shareholders Association joint
publication), at
http://www.asic.gov.au/fido/fido.nsf/byid/7B41A175B275EDF4CA256B030083
5233?opendocument (last visited July 14, 2004).
9
Stephen Bottomley, The Role of Shareholders’ Meetings in Improving
Corporate Governance, AUSTL. NAT’L UNIV. CTR. FOR COMMERCIAL LAW, at
45 (Sept. 2003) (finding that the median cost of holding an annual general
meeting in Australia was AU$15,000, and the average cost was AU$44,042).
The cost in very widely-held corporations may, however, be even higher. See
Nat’l Roads and Motorists’ Ass’n Ltd. v. Snodgrass, (2002) 42 A.C.S.R. 371,
373 (the court accepted an estimate of between AU$1.4m and AU$2.6m as a
guide to the cost to plaintiff of convening a meeting).
10
E.g., Corporations Act, 2001, c. 2G, § 250N (Austl.); Companies Act, 1985, c.
6, § 366 (U.K.).
11
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (2003) (amendments adopted in 1997
authorize the use of stockholder consents in lieu of an annual meeting in limited
circumstances).
12
See, e.g., Rule 302.00, New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual,
available at http://www.nyse.com/lcm/lcm_section.html (last visited July 14,
2004).
13
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228 (2003).
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of the entire body of shareholders by this written procedure is likely to
require gathering many more votes than simply securing a mere majority of
those present at a meeting.
Courts have noted that a physical gathering provides a forum for
deliberation and confrontation.14 Commentators have similarly observed
that the feature of confrontation or “face-to-face accountability” is
particularly valuable to retail shareholders.15 Courts and commentators both
also note that views expressed at a meeting by minority shareholders can
change the course of corporate policy, even if they do not carry the vote.16
For example, a corporation may be keen to head off potential damage to its
reputation stemming from environmental protests or other widerstakeholder concerns.17 As a result, the trend in the UK and Australia is not
to disband the meeting, but rather to find ways to revive it, by encouraging18
or requiring19 institutional shareholders to participate more actively, and by
suggesting modest improvements to the way meetings are conducted, such
as clearer notices of meeting and better handled shareholder
communication.20
¶9

14

E.g., Hoschett v TSI Int’l Software Ltd, 683 A.2d 43, 45-46 (Del. Ch. 1996).
See Responses of GLB Pitt, The Institute of Chartered Accountants of
Scotland, ICSA and the Association of Investment Trust Companies to The
Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a
Competitive Economy: Company General Meetings and Shareholder
Communication, Question 1 (URN 99/1144, DTI, Oct. 1999), at 10, available at
http://www.dti.gov.uk/cld/reviews/condocs.htm (last visited July 14, 2004).
16
E.g., Re Compaction Systems Pty Ltd [1976] 2 NSWLR 477, Re HR Harmer
Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 62, Re Duomatic Ltd [1969] 2 Ch 365; GREG BATEMAN,
COMPANY MEETINGS: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW V-VI (Butterworths, 2001)
(comments of Justice R. P. Austin, Supreme Court of New South Wales).
17
See, e.g., Boros, supra note 4, at 178 n.159. See also Sarah Murray, Rebel
Investors Make Themselves Heard, FINANCIAL TIMES, Sept. 5, 2003, at 8,
available at 2003 WL 71588521.
18
See Financial Reporting Council, The Combined Code on Corporate
Governance, at 20, (July 2003), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ukla/lr_comcode2003.pdf (last visited July 14,
2004) (for information about the UK); Leon Gettler, Thumbs Down for Funds
Plan, THE AGE, Mar. 26, 2003, at 2, available at 2003 WL 14780337 (for
information about Australia).
19
Interpretive bulletin relating to statement of investment policy, including
proxy voting policy or guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2 (1994) (US
Department of Labor Interpretive Bulletin on the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA)), available at
http://www.dol.gov/dol/allcfr/EBSA/Title_29/Part_2509/29CFR2509.94-2.htm
(last visited July 14, 2004). See also Myners, supra note 6, at ¶¶ 79, 5.92.
20
Australian Stock Exchange Corporate Governance Council, Principles of
Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations, at 39-41,
15
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In an in-depth theoretical analysis of the necessity for meetings,
Ralph Simmonds takes the argument in favor of meetings a step further and
identifies four interconnected reasons for mandating annual meetings for
public corporations:
¶10

•

the pervasiveness of positional conflicts of interest
(i.e., managers’ interests in maintaining and enhancing
their positions);

•

the value of deliberative assemblies, such as annual
meetings, in addressing this conflict;

•

the unlikelihood that provisions for assemblies would
be generally accepted without mandatory rules; and

•

the unlikelihood that market effects would properly
compensate for the lack of such provisions.21

2. What is a Meeting?
¶11
If the value of a meeting is the forum it provides for confrontation,
debate, and deliberation, must it take the form of a traditional physical
gathering?
¶12
The answer is that the meeting probably need not take a traditional
form if the corporation has a small number of shareholders, or the
shareholders are confined to a small number of venues designated by the
corporation. In these cases, it may be possible to connect the venues by
video conference and conduct the meeting as if all members were present in
one room.
¶13
The limited case law on this topic suggests that such an approach
would not expose the meetings to a legal challenge. For example, the case
law regarding directors’ meetings illustrates an acceptance by some courts
that any forum constituting a meeting of the minds will count as a meeting,
even if it takes place using technology (such as a telephone or video
conference).22 This position was formalized by statute in many states, such

http://www.asx.com.au/about/CorporateGovernance_AA2.shtm (last visited July
14, 2004).
21
Ralph Simmonds, Why must we meet? Thinking about why shareholders
meetings are required, 19 COMPANY & SECURITIES LAW JOURNAL 506, 515-16
(2001).
22
See, e.g., Freedom Oil Co. v. Ill. Pollution Control Board, 655 N.E.2d 1184
(Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (holding that administrative agencies have wide latitude to
accomplish their official duties, and that meeting by telephone conference call
did not violate Illinois open meetings laws); cf., e.g., Swiss Screens (Austl.) Pty
Ltd & Anor v. Burgess & Ors (1987) 11 ACLR 756 (holding that “any event,
even most fleeting, in which two directors . . . reach concurrence in taking some
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as Delaware.23 Furthermore, the English Court of Appeal has also accepted
the validity of shareholder meetings held in several rooms connected by
audio/visual links that enable attendees to see and hear what takes place in
each room,24 and the Delaware General Corporation Law clarifies the
common law position that meetings held in multiple venues are valid.25
¶14
It is legally possible in Delaware to go a step further and hold a
shareholder meeting without a physical venue.26 But, practically, it is much
more difficult to conceive of a way to replicate the elements of
confrontation, debate, and deliberation in an electronic environment where
there is a large number of shareholders and the corporation has no control
over their location. The few meetings held in Delaware under the abovecited provision do not appear to have involved real time participation by
large numbers of widely-dispersed shareholders.27

To date, only two corporations have reportedly taken advantage of
the ability to hold a virtual meeting: Inforte Corp., in 2001, and Ciber Inc.,
in 2002. In the case of Inforte Corp., no voting took place at the meeting,28
and it is not clear whether any questions were asked (although the
corporation was prepared to answer questions emailed to its investor
relations address).29 Although Inforte Corp. repeated this experiment the
following year, there are no press reports on how that meeting was
conducted. Similarly, there are no reports regarding the conduct of Ciber
Inc.’s virtual meeting. However, in a report written in advance of the Ciber
meeting, the corporation expressed the hope that more than 10 of its 28,000plus shareholders would attend.30
¶15

course in the company’s affairs can be part of their management of the business
of the company, and can be described with accuracy as a meeting of the
directors and as a proceeding at such a meeting”).
23
E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(i) (2003).
24
E.g., Byng v London Life Ass’n Ltd., 1990 Ch. 170, 183 (C.A.).
25
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(a)(2).
26
Id.
27
See infra text accompanying notes 28-30.
28
Tami Kamarauskas, Inforte Corporation Hosts Virtual Shareholder Meeting,
5 No. 5 WALLSTREETLAWYER.COM: SECURITIES IN THE ELECTRONIC AGE 20
(Oct. 2001) (97% of the shares were voted by fax before the meeting).
29
Compare id., with Broc Romanek, Technology Trends for 2002, 5 No 8
WALLSTREETLAWYER.COM: SECURITIES IN THE ELECTRONIC AGE 25, Jan. 2002,
and Broc Romanek, Electronic-Only Shareholders’ Meetings: Examining the
Considerations, 4 No 2 E-SECURITIES 3, Oct. 2001.
30
Janet Forgrieve, Ciber to Hold Virtual Shareholder Meeting; Greenwood
Village Company Looks to Cyberspace to Draw Interest in Meeting, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS, Apr. 5, 2002, at 5B (according to the CEO, “[o]urs have
never been attended by more than 10 people who were not either employees or
accounting or legal advisors to us”).
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The limited number of shareholders involved in these two examples
suggests that they do not provide a template for an electronic forum offering
the opportunity for confrontation, debate, and deliberation in a widely-held
corporation. Nor do these examples provide a basis for drawing any
conclusions regarding the likely extent of the use of such provisions in the
future. They do, however, suggest that practical issues, such as
satisfactorily identifying shareholders and providing for real time
participation on a mass scale, are likely to deter corporations with a large
number of shareholders from experimenting with virtual meetings.
¶16

¶17
Admittedly, the Delaware law does not preserve all elements of the
common law concept of “meeting.” By referring to “proceedings of the
meeting,” the statute arguably requires some kind of debate and
deliberation. This might, for example, be satisfied by a “meeting” held via
a company-sponsored bulletin board. On the other hand, it would appear
not to be satisfied by a ballot held without any exchange of views.
¶18
However, Delaware law does not appear to require the forum to
provide an electronic analogy of confrontation. A bulletin board, for
example, would not be able to convey the body language of the person
answering the question.31 As a consequence, the Delaware provision
permitting virtual meetings has drawn a hostile response from those
concerned that it removes the element of face-to-face accountability so
valued by retail shareholders.32 Such sentiments also resulted in the
abandonment of a legislative proposal which would have permitted virtual
meetings in Massachusetts.33

3. Reaching Decisions Without a Meeting?
¶19
As noted above, Delaware law contains a written consent option to
allow stockholders to reach decisions without a meeting in limited
situations, requiring the same percentage of votes necessary to approve the
action at an actual meeting.34 Although this procedure does not involve
electronic communications directly, it is relevant to this discussion because
it provides a mechanism for reaching a corporate decision by means other
than a traditional physical gathering.
¶20
The procedure is qualitatively different from the common law
concept of a meeting, which offers the potential for both deliberation and
face-to-face accountability, except in cases of unanimous agreement.35 The

31

See Simmonds, supra note 21, at 517 n.116.
See, e.g., Forgrieve, supra note 30.
33
Ralph Ranalli, Corporate Meetings Bill is Shelved, Shareholder Group Raps
Online Forums, THE BOSTON GLOBE, August 24, 2001, at B.1.
34
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228 (2003).
35
See Hoschett v TSI Int’l Software Ltd, 683 A.2d 43, 45-46 (Del. Ch. 1996).
32
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editors of Delaware Corporation Law and Practice note that it was
originally intended as a procedural reform to remove red tape, but had the
unintended consequence of potentially disadvantaging management in
control contests. 36 As a result, corporations often change this default rule in
their articles of incorporation, resulting in the paradoxical consequence that
physical gatherings will generally be held, even in Delaware.37

CONCLUSION
¶21
There is great potential for electronic communication to enhance
the traditional physical gathering by providing a low-cost and
geographically unlimited means for many more shareholders to participate.
Such means may also have the incidental benefit of providing an auditable
trail of how voting rights are exercised, which may be particularly valuable
to institutional shareholders. However, these benefits can be achieved by
means short of a completely virtual meeting, such as through a combination
of webcasting the physical gathering and enabling remote observers to
participate by emailing questions, and/or voting electronically in real time.
¶22
There is also potential for both the virtual meeting and the written
consent option to be detrimental to retail shareholders because both
procedures remove the face-to-face accountability of management to
shareholders. Additionally, the written consent procedure also removes the
element of deliberation that carries with it the small, but nevertheless
important, possibility that sentiments expressed by shareholders will
influence corporate plans even if overridden by the proxy votes.
¶23
The time and cost savings of these options may seem attractive,
particularly where the items on the agenda are not contentious, but
corporations considering employing these procedures should weigh the
benefits against the potentially adverse consequences of shareholder
hostility.38 In the end, the pitfalls are not a reason to flatly reject the
potential benefits that virtual meetings can offer, particularly in terms of
greater levels of shareholder participation, but they serve as arguments that
virtual meetings should not entirely replace physical meetings in widelyheld public corporations until an electronic equivalent can be devised for
the face-to-face accountability of management to retail shareholders and the
opportunity for deliberation currently offered by physical gatherings.
36

2-31 DEL. CORP. LAW AND PRACTICE § 31.01 (2003) (“. . . Section 228
permits insurgent groups to establish the time frame for a control contest, and
such a group, by choosing its time propitiously, may obtain the upper hand.”).
37
Charles R. T. O’Kelley & Robert B. Thompson, Corporations and Other
Business Associations: Cases and Materials 151 (4th ed. 2003).
38
See Daniel Adam Birnhak, Online Shareholder Meetings: Corporate Law
Anomalies or the Future of Governance?, 29 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J.
423, 445-46 (2003).

